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Abstract—Recent benchmarks indicate that the use of public
key cryptography results in non negligible verification times on
platforms with limited processing power. In this paper, we focus
on multi-hop Inter-Vehicle Communication and show that the
increase in message processing time in vehicular nodes degrades
network performance, decreasing the number of messages that
reach destinations. We propose Adaptive Message Authentication
(AMA), a lightweight filtering scheme that reduces the number
of cryptographic operations performed by the nodes. Although
based on local observations and without any additional commu-
nication channel between the nodes, our scheme achieves global
improvement of network performance. We perform extensive
simulations and show that our scheme resists DoS attacks and
brings significant improvement even against a substantial number
of adversaries in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is envisioned that inter-vehicle communications (IVC)
will enable Vehicular Ad hoc Networking (VANET). Short-
range wireless IVC will be based on a variant of the currently
widely used IEEE 802.11 protocol. The IEEE 1609.x protocol
suite, also known as the WAVE technology [1] developed for
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), is already at
the stage of trial-use standard. Vehicles will communicate with
other vehicles within range, but, equally important, they will
cooperate in forwarding messages of their neighbors, other
vehicles or road-side units (RSUs), across multiple hops.
Vehicular communications (VC) will support various ap-
plications, among which transportation safety and transporta-
tion efficiency play a prominent role. Congestion notification
applications [2], [3], [4], envision vehicles that collect data,
create useful information and then send it across multiple
hops towards a “targeted” or “destination” geographic area.
The receiving vehicles in the destination area will utilize these
notifications, possibly to alert their drivers to avoid dangerous
areas or optimize their routes.
Security is an important requirement for this manner of
forwarding. In recent years the foundation for securing ve-
hicular communications has been laid out in the literature [5],
[6], [7] and a substantial effort in academia and industry has
been invested in providing adequate solutions; for example, the
IEEE 1609.2 trial-use standard [8], the Network On Wheels
(NoW) project [9], and the Secure Vehicular Communications
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(SeVeCom) project [10]. These prominent efforts are based on
well-established cryptographic building blocks, such as public
key cryptography, and Certification Authorities (CAs), and
they mandate that all VC messages be digitally signed and
carry the certificate of the signing node (vehicle or RSU). This
way, without any association with the signer, the authenticity
of any message can be validated by any receiving node.
Although very convenient for exploitation in vehicular
networks, public key cryptography is costly and introduces
significant processing overhead. Recent benchmarks, such as
those obtained within the framework of the European eCrypt
project [11], show that signature verification on a wide range
of computing platforms takes a significant amount of time,
even for the fast elliptic curve algorithms proposed for use
in vehicular networks [8], [9], [10]. Due to the on-board
vehicle equipment cost constraints, the currently envisioned
automotive communication boxes face the same limitations:
cryptographic message processing delays are typically in the
order of several milliseconds [12]. More importantly, with tens
of nodes (vehicles) usually in proximity, each node has to
handle and validate hundreds of messages per second.
We argue that the processing overhead in intermediate
nodes can result in decreased network performance, due to
the limited processing capabilities of the envisioned vehicular
platforms. Our goal is to decrease the number of cryptographic
operations performed by the nodes and to avoid a deterioration
in performance due to processing power limitations. At the
same time, we verify that this reduction of message verifica-
tions does not make a vehicular network more vulnerable to
outside adversaries, nor to DoS attacks.
In this paper we focus on traditional approaches to identity
management and secure inter-vehicle communication in vehic-
ular networks, such as [13]. In terms of Inter-Vehicle Com-
munication and multi-hop forwarding, these proposals recom-
mend two extreme strategies. The first group of proposals
requires intermediate nodes to verify that messages had been
sent by legitimate senders and to check the integrity of the
messages before resending them. We show that this approach
to secure multi-hop forwarding tends to be too pessimistic and
results in many unnecessary message verifications, degrading
the network performance. On the other hand, the second
approach, which advocates skipping message verification in in-
termediate nodes, neglects nodes’ vulnerability to DoS attacks;
although it performs well with few adversaries in the network,
our simulations show that when no message verifications are
performed, the goodput of legitimate nodes significantly drops
as the number of adversarial nodes in the network increases.
The solution we propose is an adaptive scheme which inte-
2grates the best features of the two aforementioned approaches.
The aim is to make nodes perform only the necessary number
of cryptographic operations while skipping the redundant
message verifications and improving the overall performance
of the network. The scheme takes advantage of the fact that
nodes in different parts of a vehicular network face different
security conditions at a given point in time. For instance, nodes
in less hostile areas can afford to be less cautious (check fewer
messages) than others. On the other hand, given the dynamic
nature of vehicular networks, the situation may change quickly
and dramatically, so nodes should have the ability to adapt to
changing circumstances.
Our contribution is twofold:
 We propose AMA (Adaptive Message Authentication), a
scheme that probabilistically checks messages in interme-
diate nodes. Our scheme is reactive in that the checking
rate increases to 100% only when forged messages are
detected, and only for a limited period before returning
to probabilistic checks. AMA is independent of the for-
warding algorithm or the wireless standard that is used
for communication and it can be easily integrated in
the existing frameworks for secure communications in
vehicular networks.
 We show through extensive simulations that the scheme
guarantees substantial performance gains over the tradi-
tional proactive approach. The adaptiveness of the scheme
brings increase in performance in cases with few adver-
saries as well as in the cases when the adversarial nodes
represent a significant percentage of the population.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In xII we
present the example vehicular applications of interest, the
motivation and the intuition behind our approach. In xIII we
describe the system and the adversary model that we are
dealing with in this work. In xIV, we define rigorously the core
of the problem we are solving. The complete description of
AMA is provided in xV, and its evaluation in xVI. We discuss
possible extensions of AMA in xVII. We present related work
in xVIII, and we conclude in xIX.
II. MOTIVATION AND INTUITION
In this section, we pinpoint why a group of VANET
protocols and applications call for a new practical solution,
such as the AMA we contribute here.
Multi-hop vehicular communication is considered in several
transportation safety and efficiency applications, in particu-
lar congestion notification and environmental hazard notifica-
tion applications [2], [3], [4]. These applications exploit the
inter-vehicle communication and more specifically GeoCast or
Position-based routing. Their messages contain the destination
or target geographic area, within which all receiving vehicles
should benefit from the information inside the messages.
The adversaries can try to degrade the performance of
such a system by creating forged messages alleging they bear
useful information (notifications, warnings, etc.). The danger is
twofold: (i) the use of forged messages at destinations and (ii)
reduction in goodput (expressed in the number of legitimate
messages that reach their destinations) caused by flooding of
Fig. 1. A few regions in the city are under attack (shaded areas) and nodes in
these regions actively defend. Nodes in the rest of the city, where the presence
of the adversaries is not felt, can relax their security. We use this road map
in all of our simulations.
the network with forged messages. The first risk is not really
a concern, as the scheme we propose requires nodes to check
each message in the destination region, prior to its use. The
impact of the second threat depends critically on the ability
of the security solution to prevent the spatial propagation
of forged messages. We address this issue by applying an
adaptive scheme, which becomes very conservative as soon
as a threat is detected. If an adversary tries to inject messages
with its current location as destination region (destination
zone), it will be detected by all the first hop neighbors, since
the scheme we propose checks all the messages received in the
destination region. In case an adversary selects a region (other
than its current location) as destination, the scheme fights this
danger not only locally around the adversary, but all the way
to the destination region, and if needed, inside the destination
region itself.
When the threat is not present, our scheme relaxes security
and avoids putting unnecessary processing load on resource-
limited on-board equipment. We show that this does not lead
to a reduction in goodput due to a possible rise in number
of forged messages in the network. The goodput is actually
increased, as processing bottlenecks caused by overpessimistic
approach in fighting the security threats are avoided.
The basic idea we exploit is based on the observation that an
adversary can in practice have only a limited physical presence
[14], [7]; adversaries can select any part of a vehicular network
and place it under attack, but they can only be in a limited
number of locations at any given time. Fig. 1 illustrates this; it
shows a part of a city with the regions in which the adversarial
nodes are present (shaded areas).
So, if the security conditions in different parts of the
network are completely different, why would the nodes in
these areas behave in the same manner? In other words, a node
should respond to a threat only when it is affected by an attack
and should reduce its defensive activities when the threat is
not present, assuming that these activities consume resources
and cause the node to underperform. With this approach, as
we show with our solution, the performance of a network
as a whole increases, as nodes perform only the necessary
cryptographic operations but skip the redundant ones.
3III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
Vehicular Communications (VCs): We consider a sys-
tem with vehicles equipped with a variant of IEEE 802.11,
on-board sensors, and a computing platform. The vehicle on-
board equipment, which we term a node, allows the exchange
of information among vehicles and roadside infrastructure
and enables a range of applications, notably including safety
(e.g., accident alerts) and traffic efficiency (e.g., distributed
congestion notification) [15], [16]. VC-enabled applications
entail two basic types of communication: (i) one-hop high-
rate safety messaging (beaconing), with messages bearing
information on the location, speed, acceleration and heading
of the sender, transmitted at a rate of 3 to 10 beacons per
second, and (ii) multi-hop communication between any sender
disseminating information to one or more receivers, identified
primarily by their location.
Safety beaconing rates are specified by standards and pro-
cessing of those beacons is obligatory: a node must maintain a
fine-grained knowledge of the motion dynamics of other vehi-
cles in its vicinity, for example, to be able to detect a danger
from a slowly moving vehicle ahead or one that attempts a
left turn. On the other hand, multi-hop communication serves,
in general, less time-critical applications, and the amount of
traffic depends on the supported application(s), and in principle
any node could initiate such a transmission.
We define L to be the set of legitimate users running
applications enabled by multihop communication and Ni as
the number of legitimate messages received by destination i
over the time period of interest. We consider here multihop
transmissions originating at each node at a constant rate
of rL messages per second. Then, in the presence of any
communication impairments and networking faults and delays,
we define the goodput L as:
L =
1
jLj
X
i2L
Ni
total time
(1)
Position-based communication protocols appear as a natural
choice for multi-hop communication, as nodes are expected
to be aware of their own location (through GPS, or other lo-
calization techniques with respect to terrestrial infrastructure),
and the highly volatile topology would make other mobile
ad hoc networking protocols inefficient in this setting. Such
algorithms, largely termed geocast protocols, are currently
under consideration towards standardization [4]. As the exact
implementation of the communication is largely orthogonal
to our paper, we consider here two representative position-
based algorithms. The first algorithm, Cached Greedy GeoCast
(CGGC) [17] belongs to the group of beacon-based unicast
routing algorithms. CGGC relies on beacons to discover the
position of neighboring nodes (within the nominal communi-
cation range), and then forwards messages in the geographic
direction of the destination, picking the node whose coordi-
nates are the closest to the destination. If the local optimum is
reached, the message is added to the local cache, where it is
kept until a suitable next hop is found. The second algorithm
we consider is Contention-Based Forwarding (CBF) with the
basic suppression scheme based on timers [18]. Unlike CGGC,
CBF is based on broadcast and performs greedy forwarding
without the help of beacons and neighbors’ tables. We believe
that this selection of routing algorithms covers two major
groups of geocast routing algorithms proposed for vehicular
networks. The first group is composed of routing algorithms
that heavily rely on beacons and neighbors’ tables in the
process of suitable next hop selection. The second group
contains CBF algorithms with different suppression schemes
that leave the next hop selection process and the forwarding
decision to the neighbors in the transmission range.
Security Assumptions: As proposed in [9], [8], [10] the
node identities are managed by a Certification Authority (CA).
Each node in the network is assigned a set of private/public
key pairs, with the latter certified by a CA. Each legitimate
node registered with the CA can participate in the VC system
operation. Basically, nodes use their private keys to digitally
sign messages they generate and the public keys of the senders
of messages they receive to validate the senders’ signatures.
In accordance with the state of the art in secure VC [8],
[10], we assume that all messages are signed with an Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-DSA), and that for
each message the certificate of the sender is attached to enable
validation of the message. The validation includes first the
validation of the certificate (by validating the CA’s signature),
and then the validation of the sender’s signature.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to a message validation as
“message checking.” We denote the processing delay needed
for a message to be checked by tC . The value of this delay
depends on the processing power of the on-board platform. For
platforms similar to those currently considered for the proof-
of-concept implementations of VC systems, characteristic de-
lays are provided in [12], [19], while for other efforts PowerPC
based platforms are used (e.g., DENSO platform [20]), with
representative processing delays available in the eCrypt project
benchmarks [11].1 Lastly, the IEEE 1609.2 efforts currently
consider for proof-of-concept purposes hardware accelerated
signature verification at several milliseconds. In all existing
and upcoming systems, the cryptographic processing delays
constitute a bottleneck. For example, even for the most power-
ful of those platforms [12], tC would be 7.2ms; if we consider
this value in a rather favorable environment, with 20 neighbors
beaconing at the lowest possible rate of 3 beacons/second, by
multiplying the three numbers, we obtain as a result that 43.2%
of the CPU time would be devoted to message checking. In
denser network settings, e.g, four-lane highways, and with the
wireless medium impairments taken into consideration, as well
as specific optimizations, still the average processing load is
at the limit of the processor for safety traffic only.
Adversary Model: In this paper our focus is on the exter-
nal adversaries, that is, adversarial nodes that do not have in
their possession system credentials (certificates issued by the
CA). Each such adversarial node is a computing platform that
can fabricate and inject messages, but cannot sign on behalf of
a legitimate node. The direct goal of adversaries is to reduce
the goodput L of legitimate nodes by injecting the forged
1On 533MHz CPU Power PC platform, signature verification for EC-DSA
with 192-bit curve (nist-p-192), requires 9 ms on average.
4messages and making legitimate nodes waste their processing
time on forged messages verification. All adversarial nodes
inject forged messages at a rate rA messages per second.
We assume that the adversaries are aware of their
number in relation to the number of legitimate nodes in the
network and we define a as the percentage of adversaries
in the network. Knowing a, the adversaries choose their
sending rate rA in order to minimize L.
We emphasize that none of the forged messages injected by
an adversarial node can be perceived as valid if it is checked by
a legitimate node. Nonetheless, the stress imposed by the need
to validate those messages is exactly what can lead to DoS.
For such an attack, any PDA or laptop can be used, while no
tampering with hardware that stores vehicle’s cryptographic
keys [10], [7] or no cryptanalytic attack are necessary. By
preventing even a small fraction of legitimate traffic from
reaching its destination, the adversary can prevent reception
of messages in an area within the necessary deadlines: for
example, consider road condition information that cannot be
validated in the targeted geographical area, resulting in traffic
jams. Or, consider increased loads from fabricated traffic that
prevent a node from performing safety related operations.
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The usage of geocast routing algorithms implies that mes-
sages can traverse several intermediate hops before reaching
the destination region. A logical question that arises is what
strategy an intermediate node should adopt with regard to
checking a large group of messages that are only relayed
by that node. It is not clear whether a message that requires
relaying should be checked by an intermediate node or just
resent without any prior verification.
Fig. 2. The performance of “check-all” vs. “check-nothing” algorithm
obtained for CBF geocast routing algorithm.
We define “check-all” and “check-nothing” as two extreme
approaches that can be applied to relayed messages. “Check-
all,” as mentioned in Section I, is the default strategy in
the existing proposals and it assumes checking of each re-
layed message, whereas “check-nothing” assumes that none of
the relayed messages are checked. Both approaches perform
well under certain circumstances, but underperform in other
cases. Our goal is to propose a scheme that provides good
performance for a wide range of values of a (percentage of
adversaries in the network) and rA (their sending rate) and to
test it with the state of the art in vehicular routing algorithms.
The “check-all” strategy guarantees the fewest forged mes-
sages in the network, as it contains them locally and prevents
their propagation. Given unlimited processing power in each
node (implying a negligible checking time tC), checking each
relayed message would be the best strategy. In this case, less
time would be spent forwarding the forged messages and the
limited wireless capacity would be used only for forwarding
the valid messages.
The “check-nothing” strategy promises good results with
few adversaries in the network, or with few injected forged
messages in the network (Figure 2). In this case, not checking
any relayed traffic guarantees that no time is wasted on
signature verifications in intermediate nodes and the goodput
L of legitimate users is improved. However, an increase in
the number of adversaries in the network quickly makes this
strategy inferior to “check-all”.
So, “check-all” is not the best approach for networks with
few adversaries and “check-nothing” gets worse as the number
of adversaries increases. We want a scheme that performs well
in both cases. It should contain the forged messages locally
(like “check-all”) in the presence of adversaries and behave
similarly to “check-nothing” with no adversaries around.
V. AMA - ADAPTIVE MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
The reasoning behind our scheme is driven by the observa-
tion that the adversaries are limited in scope and that they
cannot keep the whole network under attack at all times.
Consequently, we designed a scheme that is shown in Figure 3.
We call it AMA (Adaptive Message Authentication).
AMA has two modes of operation. We call them “check-all”
and “relaxed”. The “relaxed” mode allows nodes to pay less
attention to defensive measures. All the legitimate nodes are
initially in the “relaxed” mode. It is this mode that is expected
to bring performance gain to the scheme, as only a fraction
of received messages are checked by a node in the “relaxed
mode”. Nodes distinguish between the messages that have the
current location of the node as the destination zone and those
that only have to be relayed to others. Each message in the
first group is checked with probability 1 and each message in
the second group with probability p. If they happen to check
a forged message, the forgery is always detected and it forces
the node to switch its mode of operation to “check-all”.
“Check-all” mode is conservative and it mandates checking
each received message. A legitimate node is expected to be
in this mode when there are adversarial nodes nearby. A
node stays in “check-all” mode until it receives c consecutive
legitimate messages. Then, it switches back to “relaxed” mode.
The rationale is that if a node senses that the current
“temperature” of the neighborhood is low (no adversaries in
the neighborhood), a node can relay most of the messages
without prior authentication and integrity check and keep
checking only a small fraction of these messages in order to
ensure a timely detection of security threats. While the selected
5messages are being checked, the other messages that need to
be relayed do not have to wait before being forwarded.
Fig. 3. AMA - the scheme for adaptive authentication and integrity check of
messages exchanged between vehicles. Briefly, an AMA node can be in one
of two modes: “check-all” and “relaxed.” A node starts in “relaxed” mode.
In this mode, a node checks with probability 1 the messages destined for
itself, but only with probability p the messages destined for other nodes. If it
detects a forgery, the node switches to the “check-all” mode. In the “check-
all” mode, a node checks all messages with probability 1, and switches to
“relaxed” mode only if c consecutive legitimate messages are received.
It is possible, of course, to use a different function for the
checking rate increase, not just a step function. We show that
even this simple scheme guarantees significant performance
gains, for an appropriate choice of the parameters p and
c, under very realistic assumptions (the scheme and both
parameters p and c are known to the adversary).
VI. EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
The goal of the experimental validation is to compare the
goodput L (defined in Section III) achieved when AMA,
“check-all,” and “check-nothing” are used. The three strategies
are tested on top of two state of the art routing algorithms
for vehicular networks. These are Cached Greedy GeoCast
(CGGC) [17] and Contention Based Forwarding (CBF) with
the basic suppression scheme based on timers [18].
For generating mobility traces, based on network topologies
obtained from real maps, we use the SUMO traffic simulator
(v 0.9.8) [21] with the TraNS extension [22], [23]. Vehicular
mobility traces, generated for a specific road topology, are then
passed to the SWANS network simulator [24].
The area that we use for our simulations is about 6 sq. km
in size and it is shown in Fig. 1. It is populated with 600
vehicles that follow routes obtained from the SUMO traffic
simulator with speeds that are within the legal speed limits for
the observed road group. The full TCP/IP stack is implemented
in each node with the exception of the transport layer. At
the physical layer we use the two-ray pathloss model, which
incorporates ground reflection. At the link layer, 802.11b is
used and the range is limited to 200m. The SWANS imple-
mentation of 802.11b includes the complete DCF function,
with retransmission, NAV and backoff functionality.
For the “check-all” and “check-nothing” approaches we run
20 simulations for every combination of percentage of ad-
versaries a 2 f0; 5; 10; 30; 50g and adversaries’ sending rates
rA 2 f0; 1; 2; 5; 10g messages per second. For AMA we run
20 simulations for every combination of percentage of adver-
saries a%, adversaries’ sending rates rA, and AMA parameters
p 2 f0:05; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:5g and c 2 f20; 40; 60; 80; 100g. For
each run, we randomly pick a% adversaries out of the total
set of nodes in the network. For each generated message, a
destination region is selected at random. The legitimate node
sending rate rL is 1 message per second. The size of each
geocast message is 300 bytes. The checking time tc is 10ms.
Each simulation lasts for 500 seconds of simulation time.
Verification of beacons is extremely important from the
security point of view, so as explained in Section III we assume
that nodes check all received beacons in the simulated beacon-
ing based routing algorithm (CGGC). Beacons make a large
percentage of total traffic in all the beaconing-based routing
algorithms and for this reason we wanted to be as realistic as
possible when simulating the load that beaconing traffic puts
on the processor. The beaconing rate in the CGGC routing
protocol that we use in our simulations is 1 beacon/300ms,
i.e., the value that is likely to become part of the standard.
B. AMA parameter selection
Having calculated, through the simulations, the goodput L
achieved under AMA for all combinations of the parameters
(p; c; a; rA), we now show how to select the parameters p and
c to maximize it. This selection would be done by the network
administrator before deploying the scheme in the network.
When doing this selection, we have to keep in mind two things:
 The percentage a of adversaries is fixed, but may or may
not be known to the administrator. Below, we distinguish
two cases according to whether it is known or not.
 The adversaries will learn the selected values of p and c,
and choose their sending rate rA to minimize the goodput.
In the first case, which we call the pessimistic case, we do
not know a. So, we will select the p and c that maximize the
resulting L against a worst case combination of a and rA.
(p; c) = argmax(p;c) min
(a;rA)
L (p; c; a; rA) (2)
To visualize this selection, consider the following table,
where each entry is equal to the goodput achieved with the
corresponding row-column combination of parameters:
6(a1; r1A) : : : (a
1; rkA) (a
2; r1A) : : :
(p1; c1) 1111L : : : 
111k
L 
1121
L : : :
(p1; c2) 1211L : : : 
121k
L 
1221
L : : :
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
(p1; cm) 1m11L : : : 
1m1k
L 
1m21
L : : :
(p2; c1) 2111L : : : 
211k
L 
2121
L : : :
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
First, Eq. (2) selects the minimum element in each row.
The minimum element of a row is the goodput value that
will be achieved if we select the (p; c) pair of that row,
and the adversaries’ percentage happens to be the one in the
minimizing column. If the adversaries’ percentage is the right
one (worst case scenario for the legitimate users), they can
choose their sending rate to achieve the worst case goodput.
Then, among the minimum elements found, Eq. (2) selects
the largest one by selecting the appropriate (p; c) pair. This
way, we can guarantee the adversaries would not achieve a
lower goodput, even if they could change their percentage.
In the second case, which we call the optimistic case, we
know a but not rA. So, for the given value of a, we choose p
and c that maximize L against the worst case reply rA.
(p; c)(a) = argmax(p;c)min
rA
L (p; c; a; rA) (3)
Referring to the previous explanatory table, Eq. (3) now does
the same minimization-maximization as Eq. (2), but operates
on the columns corresponding to the known value of a. In
either case, the adversaries choose their sending rate rA to
minimize L, given the legitimate users’ choice of p and c:
rA(a) = argminrA L (p
; c; a; rA) (4)
rA(a) = argminrA L (p
(a); c(a); a; rA) (5)
Note that the adversaries do not optimize over the percentage
a, as they cannot change it.
C. Performance Evaluation
AMA outperforms “check-all” and “check-nothing” strate-
gies for all the considered values of a, regardless of the routing
algorithm (CBF in Figure 4, CGGC in Figure 5). The curves in
the figures are the mean value of 20 simulations and the error
bars extend a standard deviation above and below the mean
values. Note that the knowledge of a (which is not easy for the
administrator to obtain) guarantees only a slight performance
improvement (the pessimistic scheme performs almost as good
as the optimistic).
As we can see from the figures, in the pessimistic case,
which assumes no knowledge about the number of adversaries
or their sending rate, the goodput of legitimate nodes L
improves up to 30% for CBF and up to 33% for CGGC.
In the case of CBF, the performance gain is due to the
reduction in number of messages checked in the intermediate
nodes. Our simulation data shows that the number of checked
geocast messages drops up to 46% percent in this case.
Apart from the drop in the number of cryptographic opera-
tions, the performance of CGGC routing algorithm is affected
by the beaconing processing load. Geocast messages now
share the CPU time with beacons. Checking or not checking
Fig. 4. Goodput L obtained under (pessimistic and optimistic) AMA,
“check-all”, and “check-nothing” for the CBF routing algorithm.
Fig. 5. Goodput L obtained under (pessimistic and optimistic) AMA,
“check-all”, and “check-nothing” for the CGGC routing algorithm.
a geocast message or a group of messages can make the
difference between an immediate check of arriving geocast
message and its prolonged stay in an intermediate node due
to the CPU busy period introduced by beacons. The same
applies to forged messages, as their increased number in the
incoming queue can make valid messages wait for a period
of time before being checked and relayed. This is the main
reason why the performance of “check-nothing” strategy drops
with the increase in the number of adversaries in the network.
The introduction of other CPU tasks (not related to for-
warding) would make this effect even more visible. In case the
security unit is not a stand-alone unit and has to share the CPU
time with other tasks, the moment when an incoming message
gets its share of CPU becomes extremely important. A single
forged message or an unnecessary check of a legitimate mes-
sage can make the arriving geocast message wait for additional
few hundred milliseconds due to the CPU multitasking.
In the pessimistic case, the optimal values of p and c
obtained as explained in VI-B are p = 0:2 and c = 40 for both
CGGC and CBF. in the optimistic case, the obtained values for
p and c, for both considered algorithms, are shown in Table I.
7Fig. 6. Goodput L obtained for various adversarial sending rates rA under
pessimistic AMA for the CBF routing algorithm. The thick line corresponds
to the optimal sending rate rA.
Percentage of CBF CGGC
adversaries p c p c
a = 0 0.05 60 0.2 80
a = 5 0.05 20 0.05 80
a = 10 0.2 100 0.3 80
a = 30 0.3 100 0.2 40
a = 50 0.2 40 0.2 40
TABLE I
THE OPTIMAL PARAMETERS p AND c FOR optimistic AMA.
If the adversaries have less knowledge than what we have
assumed (i.e., if they do not know the p and c), they may
choose a sending rate other than the computed optimal rA. In
Figures 6 (for CBF) and 7 (for CGGC) we plot the resulting
L-a curves for all sending rates rA for the pessimistic choice
of p and c. We see that a suboptimal selection of the sending
rate by the adversaries results in improved performance for
our scheme. The thick line in the figures corresponds to the
optimal (for the adversaries) sending rate rA and represents
the worst case scenario (i.e. the lower bound for the goodput).
Fig. 7. Goodput L obtained for various adversarial sending rates rA under
pessimistic AMA for the CGGC routing algorithm. The thick line corresponds
to the optimal sending rate rA.
VII. DISCUSSION
We discuss two extensions for AMA that could improve
performance at the expense of complexity. First, the transition
between two modes of AMA can be smoother than jumping
from a fixed checking probability p to 1. That is, p can
increase when a forged message is detected, and decrease
when a legitimate message is checked. Second, depending on
the application’s security requirements, not all messages need
to be checked by their destinations. If AMA is also applied
to the messages received in the destination zone, the network
performance could improve.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Three major efforts to design security and privacy en-
hancing solutions for VC have been undertaken in indus-
try and academia, with the endorsement of authorities: the
NoW project [9], the IEEE 1609.2 working group [8], and
the SeVeCom project [10]. The basic ideas that transcend
these efforts are: (i) their building on top of the currently
accepted vehicular communication protocol stack that includes
safety beaconing, (ii) their reliance on a Certification Author-
ity (CA) and public key cryptography to protect V2V and
V2I messages, with consensus on the use of Elliptic Curve
DSA [25] (iii) their objective to satisfy requirements such as
message authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation (albeit
in a “lighter” manner for the IEEE effort) and (iv) their
intention to protect private user information. We note that our
scheme is oblivious to the exact use of certificates and public
keys. As a result, AMA can remain fully operational and
effective even if privacy enhancing algorithms with multiple
certified public keys (pseudonyms) are implemented. Another
recent, currently on-going effort in securing VC, is the Car-2-
Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) Security Working
Group. The baseline concepts and activities of the C2C-CC
SEC WG can be found in the C2C-CC Manifesto [4].
Prior to these efforts, a number of works investigated differ-
ent aspects of security and privacy of vehicular networks. They
outlined challenges [5], [6], they described attacks [26], [27],
[28], [7], and offered solutions [14], [29], [30], [12]. The last
two works consider cryptographic mechanisms other than pub-
lic key cryptography; in the former one, [30], symmetric key
cryptography complements the public key operations to reduce
overhead. The latter [12] uses group signature to complement
public key cryptography. Investigating those variants, with the
somewhat different processing loads, in the context of AMA
would be an interesting point for future work. The reduction
of overhead for transportation safety applications has been
investigated in [12], with simple, context-agnostic overhead
reduction schemes, and in [31], [32] that propose context-
specific strategies for overhead reduction. The investigation
of the vehicular communications security overhead and its
effect on system/application performance is extended in [33],
which considers both safety and efficiency applications and
additional security mechanisms. These works are complemen-
tary to AMA and their joint investigation with AMA is another
interesting point for future work.
8Good surveys of geographic routing protocols can be found
in [34], [35]. Regarding security aspects of geographical rout-
ing, Leinmu¨ller et al. [36] analyze the effects of false position
information on geographical routing and plausibility checks
to reduce the impact of wrong position advertisements. More
recently, a comprehensive design and performance evaluation
for secure GeoCast, including experimental implementation, is
provided in [19].
Finally, extensive work on security overhead reduction and
optimistic validation can be found in closely related areas. A
solution for overhead reduction for broadcast authentication in
large sensor networks is proposed in [37]. In [38] security-
throughput trade-off in wireless networks with adversaries
was considered. Design tradeoffs between security and per-
formance in wireless group communicating systems were
analyzed in [39].
IX. CONCLUSION
Strict security requirements for vehicular communications
led to several proposals that consider authentication and in-
tegrity check of each relayed message as necessary condi-
tions for secure multihop inter-vehicle communication. This
default approach brings considerable security overhead. Com-
plex cryptographic operations, such as signature verification,
introduce non-negligible processing delays. We show that the
measured processing times on low-end platforms can result
in degradation of network performance. On the other hand,
ignoring security can lead to DoS attacks and even more severe
decrease in network performance.
In this paper, we demonstrate that a simple, yet adaptive, fil-
tering scheme that allows nodes to judiciously decide when to
check the received message that requires further relaying, and
when to simply forward it without any delay, brings significant
performance gain. The scheme, which we term AMA, treats
multihop messages in reactive rather than proactive way and
requires checking of relayed messages only in the presence of
a threat. Our simulations with the state of the art in vehicular
routing algorithms show that, as a result of security overhead
reduction, the goodput of legitimate nodes increases up to
33%. We believe that, because of the significant gains possible,
this approach is worthy of further investigation.
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